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COMPETITION FOR INNOVATION
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
Managing innovation requires a fusion of policies taken from different legal
disciplines, including but hardly limited to intellectual property law and antitrust.
Perhaps the best policy in some cases is no policy at all, leaving everything to the
market. But there is reason to think that at least some intellectual property rights are
necessary to create incentives to innovate, and almost as good reason to think that
some antitrust is necessary to control anticompetitive collusion, exclusion and restraints
on innovation.
Both antitrust and IP law are limited and imperfect instruments for regulating
innovation. The problems includehigh information costs and lack of sufficient
knowledge, special interest capture, and the jury trial system, to name a few. More
fundamentally, antitrust law and intellectual property law have looked at markets in very
different and sometimes inconsistent ways. Further, over the last three decades
antitrust law has undergone a reformation process that has made it extremely selfconscious about its goals and has narrowed antitrust doctrine commensurately. While
the need for such reform is at least as apparent in patent and copyright law, very little
true reform has actually occurred.1
Antitrust has something useful to contribute to innovation policy in three areas.
The first concerns the relationship between innovation and market structure. The
second is the lesson that IP law can learn from the severe revision in remedies doctrine
that antitrust has developed in order to align private antitrust enforcement with antitrust
law’s underlying goals. The third concerns the way that antitrust should deal with
deficient intellectual property rules that grant far too many rights and defines them in
excessively ambiguous or overly broad ways.

*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. A version of this
paper was delivered as the Milton Handler Lecture to the City Bar of New York, February 23,
2012. Thanks to John Golden and Christina Bohannan for reading a draft.
1

SeeCHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION333–60 (2012).
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Competition, Innovation, and Market Structure
Both competition and innovation are highly sensitive to market structure.
Markets tend to force prices closer to cost when they have a greater number of sellers,
but economies of scale may limit how small an efficient firm can be. A vast literature
discusses the relationship between market structure and market competitiveness or the
relevance of structure in evaluating competitive practices. Today the consensus is quite
strong that in the past we gave market structure more importance than it deserved. 2
Nevertheless, structural queries are still essential in order to identify markets capable of
being monopolized, dominant firms, the anticompetitive potential of vertical restraints,
anticompetitive joint ventures of competitors, mergers that are likely to increase prices,
or markets particularly susceptible to collusion.3
A vast literature is also concerned with the relationship between market structure
and the rate of innovation. This literature suggests, for example, that patenting works
much better in some situations than in others.4 In some markets trade secrets or simple
first mover advantages do more to further innovation than patenting does. 5 The optimal
length of a patent or copyright varies from one market to another, even though the

2

On the demise of structuralism in antitrust policy, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal Report
and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 217 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348707. Important historical documents
include Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann,
and J. Fred Weston, eds., 1974); Edward S. Mason, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE
MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1964); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 110119, 266-272 (1959).
3

See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOW,& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,5107–
442 (3d ed. 2007).
4

SeeJAMES BESSEN &MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
5

See Richard C. Levin, Wesley M. Cohen & DavidC.Mowery, R&D Appropriability,Opportunity
and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REV.:
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 20 (1985).
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actual length generally does not.6By most measures, the rate of innovation also varies
with the number of firms in a market, being highest in moderately concentrated markets,
and tapering off as the market tends toward either monopoly or more atomistic
competition.7One pair of authors has concluded that there is probably more empirical
literature on the relationship between innovation and market structure than in any field
in industrial organization economics.8One would never know it, however, from looking at
patent or copyright cases or even the IP statutes themselves. While structural issues
play a major role in antitrust policy, intellectual property policy very largely proceeds on
the assumption that market structure is irrelevant.
The grandparent of innovation policy in the United States was Joseph
Schumpeter, the Austrian-born German immigrant who taught economics at Harvard
during the 1930s and 1940s. Schumpeter is in fact well known for two quite different
theories about innovation, although they came out of the same general argument. The
first is a theory about the amount that innovation contributes to economic growth, later
formalized and supported empirically by economists such as Robert M. Solow. The
second is a theory about which market structure is most conducive to innovation, which
a decade after Schumpeter’s death produced a very famous “debate” with another
economist, Kenneth Arrow.
Schumpeter’s first theory was that innovation contributes far more to economic
growth than does competition under constant technology. That is to say, moving a
market to more competitive performance while holding technology constant certainly
produces some gains, but these gains are nothing like the ones that can be obtained
from technological advances. Looking at his own profession, Schumpeter lamented that
neoclassical economics in the first part of the twentieth century had developed theories
of monopolistic competition, imperfect competition, and ruinous competition leading to
monopoly or collusion, all of which deviated sharply from the classical trust in markets.
Reading this literature, one would conclude that markets under industrialization had
6

Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597
(2003).
7

SeePhilippe Aghion, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith & Peter
Howitt, Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q.J. ECON. 701 (2005).
8

Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure,
in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059–1107 (Richard Schmalensee& Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989); WesleyM.Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and
Performance 129, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION (Bronwyn H. Hall &
Nathan Rosenberg, eds., 2010).
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become much less competitive in comparison with some “entirely imaginary golden age
of perfect competition that at some time somehow metamorphosed itself into the
monopolist age.” {{missing citation?}} In fact, however, the standard of living measured
by hours of labor per unit of goods had risen dramatically during the very time that
economic theory was becoming so pessimistic.9
Fundamentally, Schumpeter’s view was a critique of what had been happening in
neoclassical economics through the first half of the century. The obsession with
equilibrium, demand curves, pricing, and competitive strategy tended to see business
firms as buyers and sellers. “Efficiency” largely meant productive efficiency in the sense
of eliminating needless steps or achieving economies of scale. The theory of monopoly
focused on output and price under constant technology. Even product differentiation in
the 1930s era model of monopolistic competition10 was regarded mainly as a bad thing
because it prevented prices from moving all the way to marginal cost. 11
What all of this theory ignored, argued Schumpeter, was the truly immense
contribution that innovation had made to economic growth and the standard of living.
Further, far from being a consequence of competition, innovation tended to be a product
of monopoly because only dominant firms had the incentives to engage in significant
amounts of innovative activity.
At the same time, Schumpeter saw innovation as something extremely
unpredictable and lumpy. The growth it produced was neither gradual nor continuous.
Sporadically and unpredictably a work of genius would come along, which would yield a
tremendous spurt in productivity, a period of copying, and then the industry would settle
into a new temporary equilibrium until another spurt occurred. This “process of creative
9

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81 (1942, reprint
edition 1976). On the development of Schumpeter’s ideas about innovation and economic
growth, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHET OF INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 347-375 (2007).
10

Invented mainly by one of Schumpeter’s colleagues in the Harvard economics department.
EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF
THE THEORY OF VALUE (1933). On Schumpeter’s own attitudes toward the theories of
monopolistic competition and imperfect competition, SeeJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1116-1119 (1994).
11

Schumpeter continued these critiques in his HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 975-977 (1954).
I have used the reprint edition of 1994, with intro. by Mark Perlman)
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destruction,” as Schumpeter called it,12 involved new technologies repeatedly upending
older ones in an unpredictable but dramatic fashion that produced far more economic
growth than the ordinary forces of price competition.
A decade later, Robert M. Solow created an empirical model, often called the
neoclassical growth model, from which he estimated the nonfarm economic growth rate
as a function of rising output in relation to inputs of labor and capital, assuming no
changes in technology. The amount of actual historical growth exceeded this amount
very substantially and was thus a “residual,” which the model could not account for.
{{Citation?}} Solow attributed the residual to innovative improvements and concluded
that as much as 90% of economic growth came from these improvements rather than
mere capital accumulation under constant technology.13
Today we have an abundance of literature and diverse types of models about
economic growth.14 While they disagree about precise numbers, they all agree on one
thing: innovation very likely contributes much more to economic growth than does
competitive operation in an economy where technology does not change.
Schumpeter’s second theory has to do with the relationship between market
structure and innovation. Schumpeter argued that monopolists, or dominant firms, are
more likely innovators than are the firms in competitively structured markets. First,
monopolists have the resources to fund research and development and are typically in a
stronger position to raise outside capital. Further, because of its market dominating
position, the monopolist has less to fear from copying by rivals, and thus it is in a better

12

See SCHUMPETER, supra note 9 at 81.

13

See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV.
ECON. STAT. 312 (1957); Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70
Q.J.ECON. 65 (1956); see also Philippe Aghion &Peter Howitt, Capital, Innovation, and
GrowthAccounting, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 79 (2007); Zvi Griliches, The Discovery of the
Residual: A Historical Note, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1324 (1996). Solow himself was not much of a fan
of Schumpeter’s somewhat flourishing, nontechnical approach to the problem. See Solow’s 2007
review of MCCRAW, supra note 9, disparagingCapitalism, Socialism, and Democracyas
an“overarching [attempt] to capture a whole socioeconomic system in a few grand
generalizations.” Robert M. Solow, Heavy Thinker,THE NEW REPUBLIC(May 21, 2007,),
available at http://www.powells.com/review/2007_07_12.
14

See ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2004).
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position to appropriate the results of innovation.15The problem of price theory that found
monopoly to be inferior, Schumpeter argued, was that it always assumed that the
monopolist was doing exactly the same thing as competitors, and that its output was
lower and prices higher. In reality, however, “there are superior methods available to
the monopolist which either are not available at all to a crowd of competitors or are not
available to them so readily.”16 Thisdifference made dominant firms the great engines
of technological improvement.
Writing roughly a generation later, Kenneth Arrow took sharp issue with almost
every one of Schumpeter’s arguments.17 On the appropriation question, he argued, the
intellectual property laws should substitute for market dominance as a device for
protecting the fruits of innovation. Second, small firms have everything to gain if they
innovate aggressively and much to lose if they do not. Third, when the dominant firm
innovates, it tends to stay in the path it has already established for itself, lest it lose the
value of previous investment. By contrast, the smaller rival is in a better position to
profit by upending old technology. As a result, truly radical innovations are more likely
to come from smaller outsiders.
The debate over innovation concerning monopoly and competition has revolved
around two issues. First, what is the relationship between overall industry structure and
the rate of innovation? Here the dominant, although, not unanimous answer seems to
be that the innovation curve is an inverted “U,”18 with the highest rates of innovation
15

SCHUMPETER, supra note 9 at 83.

16

Id. at 100-101.

17

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, inTHE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Richard
Nelson ed., 1962). For good analytic summaries of the vast literature on the debate, seeCohen &
Levin, supra note 8;Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the
Competition-Innovation Debate?, inINNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Adam B.
Jaffeet al. eds.., 2006);See alsoJonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007).
18

See Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship, 120
Q.J. ECON. 701 (2005). See also PHILIPPE AGHION & RACHEL GRIFFITH,
COMPETITION AND GROWTH: RECONCILING THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2005);See
alsoF.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers,57 AM.
ECON. REV. 524 (1967); F.M. Scherer, Research and Development Resource Allocation Under
Rivalry, 81 Q.J. ECON. 359 (1967); Morton I. Kamien & Nancy Schwartz, On the Degree of
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occurring in moderately concentrated markets and tapering off as the market becomes
either more monopolized or more competitive.19
The second issue revolves around the following question: Where can we expect
the most or the most important innovations to come from, established larger firms or
smaller rivals? The answer here is less conclusive, but it is certainly important that
larger established firms have madeheavy investments in their own established
technology and product designs, so they are more likely to innovate within an
established path. By contrast, the newcomer has less invested and thus a wider array
of directions in which its innovation can go. As a result we can reasonably expect more
radical innovations to come from smaller new firms. The history of information
technologies shows dominant firms dedicated to established systems continuously
upended by smaller rivals.20 One illustration is the truly heroic efforts that AT&T made
during its regulated monopoly period to thwart the divergent technologies of smaller
rivals offering alternative wireless services.21 Another is the efforts by Microsoft in the
1990s to prevent the evolution of internet-based operating systems and information
processing, which would threaten Microsoft’s established model in which operating
systems and most programs resided on each computer’s hard drive.22
Today ,important parts of United States antitrust policy tend to side with Arrow in
this debate, as, I believe, they should. For example, the 2010 Merger Guidelines

Rivalry for Maximum Innovative Activity, 90 Q.J. ECON. 245 (1976). See also Cátia
Felisberto, The Relationship Between Competition and Incumbent's Innovation, J. INDUSTRY,
COMPETITION & TRADE (2010).
19

However, some find that more competition leads to more innovation. See, e.g., Baker, supra
note 17,at 585-587.
20

In telecommunications, seeTIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INFORMATION EMPIRES, 1-32,173-186 (2010).
21

For a good brief account, see Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Innovation-Centric Approach
ofTelecommunications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA.J.L. & TECH.221 (2011).
22

See generallyUnited States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), aff ’d in part,
rev’din part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
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express a strong concern about larger firms acquiring highly innovative small firms in
order to either capture or shut down their innovation efforts.23
The relationship between market structure and innovation raises one perplexing
question: Why is structure so important inan antitrust analysis of competition but almost
completely ignored in the law of intellectual property rights? Very likely the main reason
is that the IP laws were established long before modern concerns about market
structure were developed, a change that took place mainly in the early twentieth
century. By contrast, antitrust policy developed simultaneously with these concerns
regarding market structureand expressly incorporated them at a fairly early stage.24
Antitrust law has always been viewed as a mechanism for assessing and controlling
competition. The fact is, however, that the promotion of innovation is much less central
to intellectual property law than the promotion of price competition is to antitrust law.
Rather, the IP statutes and most of the relevant case law have tended to view IP as a
set of property rights, which are absolute in the sense that they are largely invariant to
market structure or market specific incentives to innovate. Relatively few decisions
assess a particular IP doctrine against theoretical or empirical accountings of the impact
on innovation. Indeed, in the area of copyright law, the Supreme Court has largely read
the innovation incentivizing preface to the Constitution’s intellectual property clause out
of the document. It has permitted both retroactive copyright extensions and even the
retroactive granting of copyrights to works that were never covered under United States
copyright law to begin with.25 Such decisions cannot be squared with the limitation on

23

UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE ANDTHEFEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES §6.4 (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
The theory is discussed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition underUnder the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS.ORG. 3 (Apr. 20, 2011), available
athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1702843.
24

See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis, 1890-1955[!], 94
MINN.L.REV. 311 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of
Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989).
25

See e.g.,Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) (affirming a retroactive grant of copyrights);see
also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (affirming a congressional grant of retroactive
copyright term extensions).
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the Constitution’s grant of the intellectual property power that it be reasonably
calculated to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”26
The outcome of the Schumpeter-Arrow debate has important consequences for
antitrust policy. If one believes that the most important innovations come from dominant
firms, then the role of antitrustlaw should be fairly modest. Dominant firms typically do
not need very much protection from the antitrust laws and most of their innovative
conduct is presumably unilateral. Further, smaller rivals are less deserving of antitrust
protection as long as we believe that they are mainly free riders or other kinds of
copyists rather than true innovators themselves.
By contrast, if Arrow is correct and ground breaking innovations are more likely to
come from small firms, then antitrust has a much bigger role to play. First, larger firms
with entrenched investments to defend are more likely to use exclusionary practices
directed against rivals, and these practices may amount to restraints on innovation.
Second, innovations from smaller firms are more likely to be collaborative rather than
unilateral.
Harms and Remedies
After years of litigation, antitrustscholars have learned that devising good
substantive rules is very difficult. To say that courts are not good at quantifying market
power or assessing the overall economic effects of practices is a serious
understatement. One thing the Supreme Court has done, however, is put goals ahead
of substance by examining the nature of the plaintiff’s harm. For example, analyzing the
impact of the essentially vertical merger in the Brunswick case, in which a supplier of
bowling equipment acquired a struggling bowling alley in Pueblo, Colorado, could be
extremely difficult.27 Over the last half century antitrust policy has waffled between
extreme hostility and extreme tolerance of vertical mergers. The analysis almost always
provokes sharp disagreements about the creation of efficiencies, for which the
opportunities are manifold, and foreclosure of rivals.28 But the plaintiff in the Brunswick
case was a competing bowling alley and the theory of its complaint was that Brunswick
was going to rejuvenate the acquired alley, thus increasing the amount of bowling
26

U.S. CONST.art. I, §8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries;”).
27

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).

28

See IVA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 10 (3d ed. 2009).
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competition in Pueblo, Colorado. Once we understand the nature of the plaintiff’s injury
it is easy to dismiss this complaint without getting knotted up in the intricacies of market
definition and merger law. It is not antitrust’s purpose to prevent markets from
becoming more competitive. In the wake of Brunswick, the “antitrust injury” doctrine
developed as a mechanism for denying standing to plaintiffs who had not suffered the
kind of harm that the antitrust laws were designed to remedy.29 That holding was in
apparent violation of the explicit provision of Section Four of the Clayton Act, which
gives a damages action to “any person who shall be injured” by an antitrust violation,30
placing no limitation whatsoever on the nature of the injury.
Given the constitutional purpose of the patent and copyright laws to promote
innovation–a goal that is stated much more specifically than Congress’s power to
regulate commerce which empowers the antitrust laws–the same thing should apply
with even more force to IP. In fact, analyzing the impact of a particular IP practice or
accused infringement on innovation is generally far more difficult than analyzing impacts
on ordinary price competition for antitrust purposes. So IP law should require a more
potent theory of harm, particularly in light of the fact that virtually all post-issuance
enforcement of patents or copyrights comes from private plaintiffs.
For private plaintiffs, the analogy between antitrust and intellectual property
enforcement is strong. While the vast majority of antitrust lawsuits are brought by
private plaintiffs, one finds an even higher percentage ofprivate plaintiffs in patent and
copyright infringement suits. Private antitrust plaintiffs do not sue in order to promote
competition, but rather to protect their own interests, which may or may not coincide
with competitive outcomes. Consumers are preferred plaintiffs; competitors are
suspect. By the same token, in intellectual property law the plaintiffs are rights holders
protecting their own property interests. One could say the same thing about IP that then
Professor Frank Easterbrook once said about predatory pricing cases–the actions
should be given to consumers rather than competitors.31 Consumers’ interests are most
directly aligned with practices that promote innovation, while rights holders are
interested in maximizing the scope of their protection, and infringement defendants in

29

SeeIIAPHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 335-359 (3d ed.
2007).
30
31

15 U.S.C. §15 (2012).

Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.L.REV. 263, 333335 (1981).
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avoiding liability. The interests of neither groupare a reliable surrogate for the amount
and scope of IP protection that promotes innovation.
In fact, the law should not be pushed that far, and it never has been for antitrust
law. Competitor lawsuits are still routinely permitted, although with more restrictions
than three decades ago. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, just as the interests of
consumers in antitrust cases are most consistently aligned with greater competition, the
interests of consumers in IP cases are most consistently aligned with the promotion of
innovation. This is true, at least, when the consumers themselves are not the infringers,
something that occurs almost exclusively in copyright. The antitrust injury doctrine
helps to ensure that private plaintiff interests in antitrust cases are more aligned with
those of consumers. IP law needs an equivalent doctrine that will do the same thing for
patent and copyright infringement.
For all of the attacks on private antitrust enforcement, the fact is that a strong link
exists between antitrust damages and competitive harm, particularly in overcharge
cases. We condemn properly defined antitrust violations because they cause higher
consumer prices and also the “deadweight loss” that results from inefficient customer
substitution. If we have defined the conduct correctly, an antitrust violation produces
competitive harm or, in attempt cases, viably threatens to do so.
The effects of IP infringements are very different, however. In the short run,
nearly all infringing activities increase output, and thus, at least presumptively, increase
economic welfare. One can posit a hypothetical situation in which the IP owner is a
monopolist and the infringer makes a perfect copy–perhaps bypirating digital works. In
that case, one might say that each sale by the infringer reduces by one the sales of the
rights holder. But even that is not really true. Given its significantly lower development
costs, the infringer will very likely charge a lower price than the rights owner. This is
almost universally the case, for example, with situations such as digital piracy. As a
result, total output will increase, although some wealth is transferred from the rights
holder to the pirate.
In the much more common cases where the rights holder is not a monopolist or
the infringer is making an imperfect copy, then infringement virtually always results in an
output increase. Indeed, in many of these cases, the rights holder cannot show any
loss of output at all, but only the nonpayment of a license fee, which again is a pure
wealth transfer. In some cases, such as infringing derivative works where the goods in
question are complements, not uncommon in copyright law, sales of the infringing work
actually increase sales of the protected work. In that case the infringement is a pure
Pareto improvement. For example, that is what happened in the case of Dan Brown’s
best selling novel The Da Vinci Code. Brown acknowledged in his preface that he had
borrowed some ideas from a well done nonfiction book by Michael Baigent, Richard
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Leigh, and Henry Lincoln entitled Holy Blood, Holy Grail. That book had explored the
history of the idea that Jesus Christ and Mary Magdelene had a romantic relationship.
That legend was a well established heresy in the Catholic Church. In response to the
publicity attending The Da Vinci Code, sales of Holy Blood increased many fold, briefly
putting the book on a British nonfiction best seller list. Nevertheless, the publisher of
HolyBlood brought a copyright infringement action, which was ultimately dismissed
because DanBrown may have taken some ideas, but, critically, he did not take
expressions.32
Do output increases entail that IP infringements actually increase rather than
reduce economic welfare? No, but it means that infringement remedies are justified
only if we look beyond the short run and consider their impact on the incentive to
innovate. If a rights holder cannot show that the type of harm it suffered is of a kind that
would havereasonablydeterred it from innovating the protected idea or expression in
question, then that rights holder has not shown any social harm whatsoever. In the
short run welfare is increased, and in the long run the incentive to innovate is not
reduced. Indeed, in the case of complements the infringement can actually increase the
incentive to innovate. For example, considered exante the authors of Holy Blood, Holy
Grail would very likely be more rather than less likely to write their scholarly book if they
knew that some of its ideas would later be the subject of a blockbuster novel that
acknowledged their contribution.
One problem that reformation of this nature confronts is that thanks to years of
special interest capture the IP laws provide quite explicit measures for damages. For
example, copyright damages can be measured by the infringer’s gains rather than the
producer’s losses, thus making it possible for a rights owner to sue even though it has
not been injured at all.33 Copyright law also provides for statutory damages measures
that require no proof of harm of any kind.34Both copyright and patent law permit
damages to be based on projected lost licensing revenues.35

32

Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 719 No. HC04C03092 (U.K.), aff’d,
[2007] EWCA (Civ) 247 No. A3 2006/0971;seealsoBOHANNAN&HOVENKAMP,supra note 1, at
53.
33
17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2011).SeeMICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 147-162 (2009).
34

17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (2011),

35

17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2011); 35 U.S.C. §284 (2011).
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The relevant issue, however, is not how damages should be measured, but
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages at all. That is, should a court concerned
about innovation harm graft onto the damages provision a requirement that before the
plaintiff is entitled to damages, it must show the appropriate kind of harm, which is
objectively measurable loss of the exante incentive to innovate?If the entitlement to
recovery is established with sufficient rigor, then the amount of damages is relatively
less important. That is precisely what the Supreme Court did for private antitrust cases
in Brunswick. The Clayton Act’s damage provision is extremely broad, providing treble
damages to “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,” while saying nothing at all about the type of
injury.36Brunswick did not change the way in which damages are measured, and the
historically used measurements of overcharges for consumers or lost profits for rivals
remain common.37 Rather, Brunswick created an additional requirement, nowhere
mentioned in the statute, that the harm in question must be not merely injury in fact, but
injury to competition. Courts in IP cases could continue to measure damages by the
statutory formulas, but only after they have determined that the plaintiff suffered the
right kind of harm.
In contrast to the damage provisions, the law of injunctions is largely judge made
and rests on traditional equitable principles. The Supreme Court so held for patents in
its eBay decision, and observed that it was already the case for copyright.38 In its
Cargill decision the Supreme Court extended the antitrust injury doctrine to antitrust
actions seeking an injunction.39 In this area the courts are not constrained by statutory
language. The patent statute provides only that the courts “may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
36

15 U.S.C. 15(a) (2011).

37

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE, Ch. 17 (4th ed. 2011).
38

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006) (entitlement to preliminary
injunction requires equity plaintiff to prove: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction). The Court further noted that this approach was consistent with its
approach in copyright cases.
39

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).

Hovenkamp

Competition for Innovation

October, 2012, Page 14

patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”40 This language gives the
courts broad discretion to decide when an injunction against infringement is appropriate,
and decisions in the wake of eBay have done so – for example, generally denying
equitable relief to non-practicing entities even though the statute makes no such
distinction.41 The courts have done largely the same thing in copyright cases.42
Using Antitrust Policy to Limit the Effects of IP Overreaching or Ambiguity
Antitrust Governance on the IP Commons
Commentators, particularly in patent law, have been involved in important
discussions about whether the scope of IP protection should vary with the industry – for
example, longer periods for durable products such as pharmaceuticals and shorter
periods for more ephemeral technologies such as electronics and information
systems.43 But the regulatory costs of administering a system that truly differentiated IP
protection by market structure would be extraordinarily high.
What we largely have developed instead is a perhaps second best solution of
permitting private contracting to yield industry specific protections. This has occurred
through a remarkable array of devices, including patent pooling and cross licensing,
blanket licensing in digital industries, standard setting and interconnection protocols,
40

35 U.S.C. § 283 (2011).

41

See,e.g., Ricoh Co., Ltd. V. Quanta Computer, Inc., 2010 WL 1607908, at *1 (W.D.Wis. 2010)
(citing the fact that patentee is a NPE as reason for denying injunctive relief). See also Voda v.
Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Affirmingaffirming denial of permanent
injunction and district court's ruling that while the patentee's non-party exclusive licensee may
have suffered irreparable harm from the infringement, the patentee failed to prove that it,
personally, suffered irreparable harm); Foster v. Am.Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317,
1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming denial of a permanent injunction and order of a compulsory
license where patentee did not commercially practice the patented invention: “An injunction to
protect a patent against infringement, like any other injunction, is an equitable remedy to be
determined by the circumstances.”).
42

See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994) (noting that the goals of copyright law are “not always best
served by automatically granting injunctive relief”).
43

E.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.1575, 162930 (2003); BOHANNAN&HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, Chs.1, 3-5.
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and open source provisions. In many cases these devices represent a private
mechanism to “contract around” intellectual property rights that have become excessive
or inappropriate to the needs at hand. Further, the form of these contractual
workarounds varies considerably with the nature of the technology and the structure of
the market at issue.
Because these systems are private, they are for the most part not authorized or
managed by the regulatory provisions that constitute our intellectual property system.
The IP laws, after all, are concerned mainly with how innovation is created and provided
with protection, not with how it is disseminated.44 For example, the patent system is
generally characterized by a considerable degree of agency (PTO) control over the
decision to issue a patent, but relatively little control of what is done with patents after
they are issued. Post-issuance enforcement practice is left largely to the courts.
Further, the incentives for creating and managing these contractual devices are selfserving. As a result, the tools of antitrust are better for addressing both competition
restraints and innovation restraints within the context of these arrangements.
One thing that could considerably further innovation policy is more formal legal
recognition of private IP regimes. These regimesshould include greater protection from
outsiders, such as patent infringement suits from non-practicing entities who often are
not members of patent pools because they are not practicing anything. The form of this
protection should include much more specific notice requirements and limitations on
remedies, mainly to damages.
One very important role for antitrust in innovation intensive markets lies in the
vast area called the “innovation commons,” or where the production and dissemination
of technology or information involves the joint activities of two or more persons.45 IP law
has surprisingly little to say about collaborative conduct other than its various
declarations that IP rights can be assigned and licensed – that is, that they are to be
treated just as any other rights in personal property.46 In addition, the Patent Misuse
44

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GMU L.REV. 1119
(2012).
45
46

See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, Ch. 12.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2011) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by
will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession”); 35 U.S.C. §
261(2011)(“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by
an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in
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Reform Act has provided since 1988 that combining two or more patents together for
licensing purposes is not unlawful unless the seller has market power in the patent on
which the bundling condition is placed.47 Beyond this, patent pools, cross-licensing,
standard-setting involving IP rights, blanket and packages licenses and related forms of
collaborative innovation or dissemination are governed mainly by antitrust and
occasionally by the related doctrine of IP “misuse.”
The literature on patent pools tends to accept as given that patents confer
valuable property rights, and then tries to explain both the benefits and competitive
dangers of pooling. Significantly, patents are nonrivalrous, which means that one
person’s “consumption” of a patent via licensing does not reduce the amount that is left
over for others. This provides a strong rationale for pooling because a productimproving technology can be shared across a large number of producers, or even an
entire market. Because the costs of research and development are largely fixed, per
unit costs decline as the number of units produced increases. This can make sharing
both profitable and economically efficient. It also induces sharing at the pre-innovation
stage, where firms can share the costs of failure as well as of success. For example, a
firm might balk at investing $1,000,000 in an innovation project with a limited chance of
success. However, the investment is more attractive if each of ten firms puts in
$100,000. Losses will be smaller if the project fails and the firms can share the result if
it succeeds.
The fact that patents are nonrivalrous also entails, however, that restrictions on
output must be scrutinized more carefully than output restrictions for rivalrous
commons, such as fisheries or shared grazing rights. Each fish taken from a common
pool reduces the number available to other fishermen. As a result catch limitations are
like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to
the whole or any specified part of the United States”).
47

35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2011).
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:
… (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.
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essential to commons management. Thus there is nothing suspicious about a rule in a
commons for, say, grazing rights that limits each rancher to 100 heads of cattle.48
An output limitation in a patent pool must be examined more closely, because
one firm’s use of the patent does not limit the number of uses available for other
members of the pool. Rather, the problem with patents is on the output side rather than
the use side. Each sale of a patented good reduces by one the number of sales that
are available to others in the pool.
Antitrust policy generally views output limitations as bad, but patent pools present
the problem that the shared assets are for the most part fixed costs. As a result,
unrestrained competition among pool members in the output market may drive prices so
low that members may not be able to recover their investment. This may reduce pool
members’ incentive to innovate further. To be sure, antitrust has a rule of reason and
an ancillary restraints doctrine for addressing this issue, but the rule of reason asks
whether a restraint will, on balance, actually increase rather than decrease output. It
does not ask whether an output reduction and higher prices are needed to pay off the
investment in patenting.49 For example, under rule of reason analysis one considers
such questions as whether the patents in a pool are fundamentally complements or
whether they are substitutes. Complements suggest integration, elimination of double
marginalization and thus higher output. Substitutes suggest the possibility of collusion.
The judicial approaches to this problem have not been particularly helpful. For
example, in both the Bement50 andGE51 cases the Supreme Court upheld productprice
fixes in license agreements, mainly on the theory that a patent conferred a monopoly
that entitled the owner to set its output and to carve out a specific portion of that output
for licensing to another. For example, if a patentee should identify 1000 units as the
amount that would maximize its own profits were it to produce everything, then it should
48

On rivalrous vs. nonrivalrous commons, see BOHANNAN&HOVENKAMP, note 1 at Ch. 12. The
seminal work on rivalrous commons is ELINOROSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
49
Cf. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(condemning professional association rule forbidding engineers from bidding for jobs on the
basis of price; defendant’s rationale was that price bidding would cause prices to fall, inducing
engineers to cut corners on projects)).
50

Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90-94 (1902).

51

United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 487-490 (1926).
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be able to license another firm to produce 400 units, reserving the other 600 to itself.
Alternatively, the patentee should be able to require the licensee to charge a specific
price when it sells the licensed product.(NOTE: The author uses a lot of vague nouns–it,
they, them–that refer back to improper nouns mentioned earlier. I tried to clear up some
of the areas that are unclear but I am not sure the extent to which these are stylistic
choices).
This reasoning is fallacious to the extent that many patents are of dubious
validity. It permits product collusion disguised as a patent license. The reasoning is
also mistaken, however, if the patents in question are perfectly valid. In this case, the
reasoningattributes the entire value of a cartel markup to the value of the patents–
something that is almost never the case. To give a simple example, suppose you
patent a device that permits the digital display in a wristwatch to show its numbers in
pink rather than the usual gray or orange. I patent a watchband that latches with a hook
rather than a buckle. We are the only two watchmakers in the marketand we pool our
respective patents and fix the output price of watches, raising it from, say, $10.00 to
$20.00. The amount of the cartel markup very likely has little or nothing to do with the
value of these patents, which add little to the value of the watch. The patents could be
perfectly valid, yet they have little to no value because few customers are willing to pay
significantly more for the technology that they offer.
That leaves the problem of “excessive” competition in patent pools. Should
product market restraints on output or price be justified because this is the only way that
pool members can avoid competing price down to a level insufficient to cover
investments in innovation? While that problem may exist in the rare patent pool for a
commodity,52 it is not likely to apply to markets for product differentiated goods.
Manufacturers of digital cameras, smartphones, players of digital media and numerous
other users of patent pools produce distinctive products that sell at different price points
and with different features. This means that each manufacturer faces a somewhat
downward-sloping demand curve and that prices will be above short-run marginal
cost.For the most part the firms will be able to recover their fixed costs, including
investment in patents or copyrights.53 To be sure, product differentiation does not
52
53

A possible example is memory chips, which have become close to a commodity.

Both monopolistically competitive markets, which are characterized by low barriers to entry,
and oligopolistic product differentiated markets can have equilibria that accommodate significant
fixed costs. See Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic
Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217,220 (1976). In general, higher fixed costs are associated
with a greater degree of differentiation and a smaller number of firms that the market is able to
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guarantee positive returns, but it does suggest that most pools should be able to survive
and prosper without restraints on product output.
One deficiency in the literature on patent pools is that it tends to accept as given
that patents are valuable property rights, and then devises explanations for why they
are pooled. There is another important explanation, however, which is that patents in
heavily pooled industries have little value or in many cases even negative value. For
example, Bessen and Meurer conclude that in most industries other than
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, the private value of patents is less than the cost of
obtaining them, keeping them up to date, and defending them in litigation. 54 In these
industries–which involve information technologies where a great deal of pooling occurs–
pooling is simply a way of “contracting out” of a system that does the participants more
harm than good. By pooling,participants can produce their products free of the costs of
infringement litigation. If the pool covers future as well as already granted patents it
may reduce the incentive within the industry for patenting but will not reduce the
incentive to innovate. This is particularly true if the innovations can be protected by
trade secrets or first-mover advantages that are not shared.55
Where patents are very low in value in relation to litigation costs, then a
phenomenon called “tacit pooling” may occur among patent owners who are actually
producing a product.56 The very existence of tacit pooling reflects very poorly on the
state of the patent law. If two firms each hold a significant pool then the risk and
expected cost of litigation in both directions may be larger than the expected return.

support. See Avinash K. Dixit, Some Reflections on Theories and Applications of Monopolistic
Competition 123, 128, inSTEVEN BRACKMAN & BEN J. HEIJDRA,THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
REVOLUTION IN RESTROSPECT (2004); JEFFREY PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 485 (2008). In the pure Chamberlin model with easy entry price is at average total
cost, which includes fixed as well as variable costs. For a graphic illustration, see "Cost and
Revenue for Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition,” the Wolfram Demonstrations Project,
http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/CostAndRevenueForMonopolyAndMonopolisticCompetitio
n/
54

BESSEN AND MEURER, supranote 4, at 141.

55

For contrasting views, see Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz.L.Rev. 165,170 (2011); Ryan Lampe &
Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing
Machine Industry (Working Paper, June 8, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1308997.
56

See Erik Hovenkamp, Tacit Pooling(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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The biggest problem facing pool members is patenting by firms that are not
inside the pool or, worse yet, non-practicing entities(NPEs)who are not in the pool
because they are not producing anything. This makes it critical that the patent rights of
non-practicing entities be appropriately restricted. One helpful signal is the increasing
tendency under eBay to limit NPEs to damages.57 A better solution, but which might
require a statutory amendment, would be to place stronger obligation upon NPEs to
give more precise and effective notice to likely infringers and to make patents
enforceable only subsequent to the time that such notice is given. 58
In any event, pooling in order to neutralize the harmful effects of negative value
patents represents an extreme social cost. First is the administrative cost of creating
such patents and accumulating them in the first place. Second is the cost of forming
and operating pools and defending members against threats from outside. Butno
matter how costly,antitrust is not a roving mandate to repair deficiencies in the patent
system. Accepting the existing patent regime as given, however, antitrust can facilitate
the kind of pooling arrangements that restore incentives to innovate andtocompete that
the patent system has taken away.
Patent Aggregators, Transaction Costs, and Notice
It is difficult to be as sanguine about patent aggregators, which are usually nonpracticing entities that buy up large portfolios of patents by assignment. The largest of
these, Intellectual Ventures, may own some 30,000 – 60,000 patents.59 Aggregators
engage in a number of activities that defy simple characterization. They may be
valuable for those creating defensive portfolios to be used against patent infringement
suits by others with very large portfolios. But clearly one of their most significant
activities is bringing infringement lawsuits against producers of existing products who
may have unwittingly infringed one or more patents in the aggregators’ portfolio.
One problem that aggregators’ activities expose is that the largest private value
of patents in certain technologies results not from their ability to incentivize innovation
but rather from the high transaction costs that they impose–mainly on independent
innovators. Simply construing dozens of patents, not to mention defending against
them in infringement suits, can be extremely costly. To the extent that infringement
57

See discussion supra, text at note 40.

58

See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supranote 1, at 348-350.

59

See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN.TECH.L.REV. 1
(estimating 30,000-60,000); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 (2011), available
athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (estimating more than 30,000).
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suits are launched against independent innovators the result is almost certainly to
increase rather than reduce incentives for innovation.60
The patent system and the courts should place greater pressure on patent
holders to provide adequate and timely notice of their rights. For example, today a
developer of a product involving information technologies may receive a letter offering to
license from an aggregator or pool with no specific mention of the patents that the
holder claims will be or are being infringed (NOTE: term “offering to license” seems
awkward but it could be a term of art).61 This effectively puts the producer to the task of
identifying which of many hundreds or thousands of patents it might be infringing–
typically at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars–or else of paying a much smaller
license fee.62 Another problem is the eighteen-month gap during which patent
applications are held in secret.63 Under current law the application is kept in confidence
during this eighteen-month period, or right up to the date of patent issuance if the
applicant is not seeking foreign patent protection. This effectively means that
technology developed by others during this period is protected by the patent even
though nothing was disclosed to the public.
A better rule would be to give the patent applicant a choice. If it publishes the
application immediately then it will have protection with respect to all patent claims that
survive to patent issuance. If it refuses to publish, then it loses protection for technology
60

SeeFTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, note58, at 8.
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C.f., Nero AG v. MPEG LA, LLC, 2010 WL 4878835No. 10-cv-3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 U.S.
Dist. WL 4878835, at *2 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (potential licensee complains that due to
expense and impracticality, it is unable to identify which patents in pool are essential to its own
technology).
62

C.f. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327-1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (awarding
sanctions against a financial services patent holding company that filed frivolous patent
infringement suits against numerous defendants, accompanied by offers to settle that were
considerably lower than the cost of reviewing the patents in order to determine infringement).See
id. at 1327, noting that Eon-Net’s offers to settle were in the range of $25,000-$75,000, while the
costs of discovery related to claim construction alone in the present case exceeded $600,000.
“Here, the district court did not clearly err when it found that Eon–Net filed an objectively
baseless infringement action against Flagstar and brought that action in bad faith, specifically to
extract a nuisance value settlement by exploiting the high cost imposed on Flagstar to defend
against Eon–Net's baseless claims.” The court also approved the lower court’s award of Rule 11
sanctions.
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developed during the period prior to disclosure. One objection, of course, is that the
patent may never issue, and then the applicant has disclosed without obtaining patent
protection. This point however, only serves as an incentive for applicants to draft patent
claims more narrowly and make sure that they have met all of the patent law’s
requirements, including novel and nonobvious subject matter, before applying. Further,
the applicant who chooses not to disclose loses patent protection during the interval
between application and issuance, but it retains any trade secret protection against
misappropriation. Mainly, until the patent issues and disclosure is made, it loses
protection against independent discovery.
By and large the patent system has not taken the social value of notice seriously.
In general, the more intangible a property right is and the more ambiguous its
boundaries, the more importantit isthat notice be provided. Further, the cost of
providing notice of a particular property right is almost always less than the cost of
searching among many. The real property system recognizes this and, even though
real property rights are far more tangible, has created a highly effective notice system.
We don’t have an industry of “real property trolls” who have placed nondevelopment
covenants in land and lie in wait for some unsuspecting developer. The reason is
simple. Notice is clear, the landowner must supply it, and the penalty for not supplying
it is loss of the right.64
Patent Exclusions and Inequitable Conduct
Exclusionary practices involving intellectual property rights generallyprovide a
smaller role for antitrust than do collaborative practices because so much exclusion is
controlled in the first instance by the intellectual propertylaws themselves. Under the
decisions of the Federal Circuit, the role of antitrust in policing patent exclusion is
narrowing even further. For example, under the Supreme Court’s WalkerProcess
doctrine, a patentee can violateSection2 of the Sherman Act by filing an infringement
suit on a patent that was procured by “fraud,” which generally means inequitable
conduct, or the making of false or misleading statements to the Patent Office during the
examination process.65 Under the decisions of the Federal Circuit, however, inequitable
conduct has become extremely difficult to prove. Its 2011Therasensedecision required

64

See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP,supra note 1, at 130-132; Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX.L.REV. 221, 224 (2011). See also Peter S. Menell & Michael J.
Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities (working paper, Dec. 15, 2011) (providing
many examples), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973171.
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Walker Process Equip.Inc. v. Food Mach.andChem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174173-173
(1965).
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specific intent to deceive the PTO on a material issue.66 Even when inequitable
conduct is found, the Federal Circuit has raised an extremely high bar for antitrust
counterclaims. In its Dippin’ Dots decision, for example, the patentee lied to the PTO
about numerous sales that had occurred more than one year prior to the filing of its
patent application, thus making the technology unpatentable under patent law’s on sale
bar.67 The court found clear evidence of intent to deceive the PTO, and that the patent
was unenforceable. Some thirteen years later the patentee filed an infringement suit, at
a time when evidence of prior sales would be extremely difficult to locate and
discoverable only by happenstance. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit denied antitrust
liability, holding that while a declaration of inequitable conduct required only a single
improper act, the antitrust laws required something more. In this case there was only
the lying about the prior sales.
What the court overlooked is that, even under its odd two-act requirement there
were in fact two acts. The fact of the prior sales was enough to make the patent
unenforceable, but in this case the patentee had not only lied about them, it also filed an
infringement suit long after. That infringement suit, not the act of lying about prior sales,
was the gist of the antitrust violation.
The principal distinction between inequitable conductand Walker Process style
antitrust cases, is temporal. In general, inequitable conduct refers to actions and state
of mind that occur during the patent prosecution process. By contrast, Walker Process
refers to actions and state of mind at the time a patent infringement action is filed, which
can be many years after issuance (roughly 13 years, for example, in Dippin’ Dots). This
has several important implications.
First, there could be inequitable conduct under Therasense but relative innocence at
the time of an infringement suit if (a) the patent has been assigned to an innocent
recipient; or (b) the persons within the firm who were guilty of the inequitable conduct
are no longer available and the persons who file the infringement suit are unsuspecting.
This is highly likely to be true for firms with thousands of patents, because the kinds of
things that would yield inequitable conduct are often not disclosed on the record, given
that they tend to be omissions. One conceptual difficulty of Therasense is that state of
mind refers to persons, but large firms have many persons. That is why objective
standards are generally superior for assessing corporate behavior. Further, those filing
an infringement suit on a ten year old patent have little incentive to dig too deeply in
66

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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order to find out whether now departed patent prosecutors engaged in equitable
conduct.
Second, a patent might have been obtained without inequitable conduct, but
subsequent evidence of prior art or barring sales or use might emerge, and the person
filing the infringement action might have knowledge of these things. In that case a
Walker Process action should be permitted even though the person prosecuting the
patent was innocent of inequitable conduct as Therasense defines it.
Or to state this differently, the doctrine of inequitable conduct governs the patent
prosecution and issuance process, largely during the pre-grant stage when PTO
supervision is intense and there is little room for antitrust intervention. By contrast,
antitrust liability under the WalkerProcess doctrine is intended to refer to enforcement
activities during the post-grant stage when there is little to no PTO supervision. As a
result, the Dippin’Dots rule needs to be revisited.
Refusal to License
Going all the way back to the Colgate decision in 1919, United States antitrust
law has permitted dominant firms acting unilaterally to refuse to deal, with very few
exceptions.68 One exception that the Supreme Court recognized in its 1985 Aspen
decision is that a firm that has voluntarily established a course of dealing with a rival
may not withdraw from that venture without a good explanation.69 More recently,
however, in its Trinko and LinkLine decisions, the Supreme Court has reverted to
formulations that leave very little space for dealing obligations, provided that the firm in
question is acting unilaterally.70
In patent law, the hostility toward compulsory licensing, which is the equivalent of
duty to deal, is at least as great because it is also statutory. The Patent Misuse Reform
68

United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 467-8 (1919).
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Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604-5 (1985).
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Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004); accord
Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns Co., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1113 (2009);seeIntergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (in patents, the rule is
similar)See,Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Commc’n[2007] E.C.R. II-3601, para. 220finding
that Microsoft had an obligation under EU competition law to share server protocols with rivals
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Act of 1988 provides that it cannot be “misuse” or “unlawful extension” of a patent to
refuse to license it to someone else.71 The phrase “unlawful extension” very likely
forecloses antitrust liability as well as liability for patent misuse.72
But there is one very important difference between refusals to license patents
and refusals to deal generally. In the ordinary refusal to deal case the rival who has
been turned down must either build the refused asset for itself or else seek it from
another source. For example, if I refuse to share my gas pipeline with you, you must
either build your own pipeline or else seek transportation space on someone else’s
pipeline. Indeed, one of the objections to antitrust’s “essential facility” doctrine is that it
forces firms to share assets in public utility fashion rather than giving rivals a
competitive incentive to build assets of their own.73
In the case of patents, however, a firm who has been denied a patent license
from another does not have the option of building any technology that infringes the
other’s patent. Indeed, it will not be able to build infringing technology even if it does not
know about the other’s patent, as is apparently the case for most patent infringers. 74 To
be sure, it might be able to invent around the dominant firm’s patents, but inventing
around can be a very risky proposition if it requires a large upfront investment. Finally,
the no-duty-to-license rule applies even when the dominant firm’s patent is not being
used, and indeed, even if the dominant firm acquired it from another for no other
purpose than to shut down and deny to rivals the technology that it offered. That was
the holding in the Supreme Court’s Paper Bag case in 1908.75
71

See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (4):
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following:… (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent;…
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See Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006) (interpreting this
phrase to apply to antitrust as well as misuse).
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See 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW¶771 (3d ed.2008).
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See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law , 87 N.C.L. REV. 1421,
1422, 1450–51 (2009) (proof of copying in patent law uncommon).
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Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). See BOHANNAN AND
HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT, supra note 1at 295-298.
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Here, one partial solution that avoids the constraints of the Patent Misuse Reform
Act is to permit firms with significant market shares in the product market to acquire only
nonexclusive licenses in patents developed by outsiders. That would be an antitrust
solution, not a Patent Act solution, but it is not inconsistent with the Patent Act either.
To be sure, the Patent Act permits both the assignment of patents and the granting of
exclusive licenses.76 But that grant does no more than provide that patent should be
treated just as other forms of personal property, which means that they can be freely
transferred provided that the transfer is not unlawful on other grounds. For example,
patents are clearly “assets” covered by the antimerger provision, §7 of the Clayton
Act.77 Guidelines on merger remedies issued by the Antitrust Division in 2011 also
contemplate that antitrust management of patent acquisitions is justified.78
Conclusion
The field of “IP/Antitrust” has blossomed in the last two decades, and has
become a significant component of antitrust practice today, producing a treatise
literature79 as well as law school classes and casebooks.80 The fact is that managing
competition for innovation is a complex task, made more complex and difficult by
deficient intellectual property policies. Although courts are not perfect institutions either,
there is a lesson to be learned here. We would probably have a better and more
defensible intellectual property system if we left somewhat more to the courts and less
to the statutes. To be sure, antitrust policy has also veered all over the place, for large
76

35 U.S.C. §261 (1982).

77

See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 103 FTC 467, 471 (1984) (antitrust consent decree
applying merger law to patent acquisitions and requiring nonexclusive license as remedy).
78

United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Guidelines to Merger Remedies 11
(2011), available athttp://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf (last visited Sept, 25,
2012).
79

See generallyHERBERT HOVENKAMP ET. AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,(2d ed. 2010).
80

See generallyCHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2011); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, innovation and Competition Policy:
Cases and Materials, available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ibl/InnovationCompetitionPolicyCasebook.shtml (last visited Sept. 25,
2012).
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parts of its history, protecting competitors more than consumers. But this was less a
function of special interest capture than of lack of economic sophistication and serious
ambiguity about antitrust’s underlying goals. In the last thirty years, just as antitrust has
become more responsive to concerns for preserving economic competition and
consumer welfare, the IP laws have unfortunately gone in the opposite direction,
protecting rights holders at the expense the “progress of Science and the useful Arts”81
that would benefit consumers.
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U. S. Const.art. I, §8, cl. 8.

